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1. Introduction
Since the fall of communism in the ’90s, the Western Balkans1 have been 
undergoing fundamental and multiple transformations that are complex in their 
nature and uneasy to be explained by a single paradigm or model. Such a complex 
transformation, where democratization and transition take place in conjunction 
with nation-and state-building and European integration, usually comes at the 
expense of a truncated picture of the region. Most of the literature studies the 
region very ‘selectively’, rather in terms of conﬂ ict, democratization or EU inte-
gration, focusing only in a speciﬁ c process of the Western Balkans ‘complex trans-
formation’. Th e literature on the region although intensively engaged into these 
transformations, is quite disproportional. Much of the studies have been mostly 
and primarily focused on the nation- and state-building process, that is to say, 
1. Any deﬁ nition of the cases to be studied is problematic and questionable. Without entering in endless 
debates of who is Western Balkans I will use the term Western Balkans referring to what has been deﬁ ned as “ex-
Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania”. Th e term Western Balkans was oﬃ  cially introduced in 1998 by the 
Austrian Presidency of the EU once Bulgaria and Romania were allowed to open membership talks with the EU. 
It includes Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. I suggest seeing 
the term contextually; since for the purpose of this paper the formula above includes countries that underwent 
similar processes of a) state building (the violent conﬂ icts) b) delayed transition and c) EU perspective integra-
tion, although at very diﬀ erent modes and degrees.
EEF349.indb   55 4/12/08   8:32:43
Dorian Jano56
L’Europe en formation   nº 349-350   automne-hiver 2008
the ‘Balkanization paradigm’ has dominated the debate; transition research has 
also considered the region but lately, the focus has shifted towards the Western 
Balkans’ integration into the EU, employing so the enlargement literature.2
Th is article will try to make an overarching evaluation by looking at these 
transformations comprehensively and trying to (analytically) distinguish the ma-
jor stages that the Western Balkans has been going through. In doing so, diﬀ erent 
approaches will be employed for the purpose of analyzing the trajectories of the 
Western Balkan countries from 1990 onwards. Th is is primarily because of two 
main reasons. On the one hand “no single theory of transition has been univer-
sally recognized”3 and on the other hand the region’s development and dynamics 
cannot be fully grasped without employing diﬀ erent approaches throughout their 
course.
From ’90s onwards the region had undergone through a number of impor-
tant transformative processes, moving from a Balkanization paradigm towards 
an Europeanization one. Th e paper will try to focus on the major processes and 
trying to analytically distinguishing among them. Although it acknowledge that 
the transformations have been sometimes running in parallel and that there is 
no clear-cut of when a process ends and when the other starts, I will propose – 
for analytical reasons – three main distinguishable stages to look at the Western 
Balkans; that of nation- and state-building (the ‘last Balkanization’), the (delay) 
transition and the (pre-) Europeanization process, conceptualizing so the many 
and complex transformations in the region as ‘multiple stages’.
In the ﬁ rst part I investigate what I will call the ‘last Balkanization’ stage, a 
period that is characterized by the nation and state building process with its main 
problems being the dissolution and disorder in the Western Balkans. Here I take 
a path-dependency approach arguing that the old-type of state-citizens relations 
is to be the main reason that led these countries towards disorder and dissolution. 
As a next stage I speak of a ‘delay transition’ that the Western Balkans experienced 
(at least in comparison with Central Eastern European Countries – CEEC). Th is 
is partly because of the diﬀ erent modes of communism the two regions experi-
enced and partly because of the EU’s and political elites’ role. Here I argue that 
the Western Balkans has suﬀ ered from a governance incapacity impeding them 
to build a liberal democracy and be oriented toward a market economy. As the 
last part I will focus on the ‘pre-Europeanization’ stage that the Western Balkans 
has entered where institution and policy reforming (adapting to EU) is and will 
2. A search by keywords on 2008-07-15 of the Social Science Citation Index gave the following results. A total 
of 852 articles were found including in their title Balkan* or South* East* Europe* (Timespan = 1989-2008. 
Databases = SSCI). After a reﬁ ned search by topic keyword the following results were shown: 1) topic war gave 
139 articles 2) topic transition or democrati*ation gave 35 articles and 3) topic integration gave only 19 articles.
3. M. McFaul, “Th e Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcom-
munist World”, World Politics, 54 (2), 2002, p. 215.
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be the consequence of the conditionality resulting from the EU association and 
accession perspective of these countries.
Table 1. Th e stages of Western Balkan complex transformation
Stages The ‘last’ Balkaniza-
tion The ‘delay’ transition
The ‘pre-’ Europeani-
zation


















Correlation between the 
homogeneity and ac-
ceptance of difference
(state – citizens rela-
tions)
High uncertainty
(because of modes of 
communism, role of EU 




Th is table summarizes the various stages and main arguments discussed in the 
article.
2. Th e Last “Balkanization”
Nation- and state building process as the ‘last’ Balkanization
After the fall of communism, all Eastern European countries had to undergo 
a dual transformation where the most notable challenges to be faced were the 
economic transformation and its political democratization. Apart from these 
transformations other concerns prioritized the situation of the Western Balkans. 
Th e region’s main concern of that period was mainly related to ‘state building’4 
in the literal sense of the word albeit with the distinct proﬁ les of the individual 
cases, ranging from state weakness without unﬁ nished state building in Albania 
to inconclusive state and nation building in Yugoslavia.5 In the agenda of the 
4. “State-building is principally about the creation and maintenance of the political unit, the state” P. Kopecký, 
& C. Mudde, “What has Eastern Europe taught us about the democratisation literature (and vice versa)?”, 
European Journal of Political Research, 37 (4), 2000, p. 529.
5. Balkan Forum, Rethinking the Balkans: Incongruities of State and Nation Building, Regional Stabilisation and 
European Integration, Discussion paper ﬁ nal version (corrected), Bertelsmann Foundation and Center for Ap-
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Western Balkans politicians less importance was given to democratic values and 
economic reforms since all focus was centered on the nation- and state-building 
process. Bringing back the question of nation-state will result in disorder for the 
entire region where the most acute problem to be faced was the disintegration of 
the Western Balkan states. During the ﬁ rst decade, the dissolution of Yugoslavia 
was accompanied also with violent conﬂ ict causing many human victims, trau-
mas and dislocation of civilians, not to mention here the enormous economic 
costs it brought to the region. Th e process of disintegration in ex-Yugoslavia does 
not only regard the immediate aftermath period of the collapse of communism. 
It was an unﬁ nished business, lately revealed through the independence of Mon-
tenegro and of Kosovo. Apart from the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the Albanian 
state also underwent hard times of disorder. In the spring of 1997 the Albanian 
state collapsed, “representing a classic case of state failure where the structures 
that should have guaranteed the rule of law failed completely”6.
Such developments of the region often have been referred to as the process 
of Balkanization. Th e term ‘Balkanization’ in its historical usage had been used 
to essentially denote a process of fragmentation of larger political complexes into 
smaller and often mutually antagonistic entities; In the contemporary colloquial-
ism, the use of the term ‘Balkanization’ stands contrary to what may be ‘western’ 
values and norms.7 Here, I propose the term ‘last Balkanization’(a softer version) 
intending to describe the situation of the Western Balkan states in the ’90s un-
dergoing their last disintegration process – state partition in Yugoslavia and state 
failure in Albania.
Th e Weakness of the Western Balkan states as legacies of the past
Th e disorder and dissolution that dominate in the ’90s in the Western Balkan 
countries is complex and its causes even more so. Adding to this, the speciﬁ cities 
of each state and/or entity were diﬀ erent. But what can be seen as a common de-
nominator throughout the region is the weakness of the state. Such a weakness, 
primary of nonrepresentation, had resulted in the collapse of the state itself (the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Albanian anarchy in 1997).
Th e idea of the state that has been developed in the region was that of an 
authoritarian and/or strongly nationalistic regime, intending to bring ‘stability’ 
and ‘saving’ the state from disintegrating. However, this pattern often appeared to 
bring opposite results (instability and disintegration) since it was unable to avoid 
strong confrontation with its own citizens and most notably with the minority 
plied Policy Research, Berlin, 17-18 June, 2004, p. 3.
6. Centre for Policy Studies, In Search of Responsive Government. State Building and Economic Growth in the 
Balkans, Centre for Policy Studies, CEU (Central European University), Budapest, 2003, p. 36.
7. M. Todorova, “Th e Balkans: From Discovery to Invention”, Slavic Review, 53 (2), 1994, pp. 453-482.
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groups. In the ’90s, the strongly nationalistic and/or authoritarian states were 
simply unable to function according to demands of modern political institutions: 
as communities of free and equal citizens. “Th e political culture of statism and 
authoritarianism remained deeply embedded in the region”8 and as a result the 
Western Balkan states failed to function in the new pluralistic context. In much 
of the Western Balkan countries, non democratic political cultures remained 
dominant, in which “narrow nationalistic and populist interests had a very strong 
inﬂ uence”9.
Th e post-communism Western Balkans undoubtedly was not a very fertile 
ground for the introduction of the political culture of liberal democracy prima-
rily because of its “legacies of war, of communism, and of history”10. Employing 
such a ‘path dependency’ logic, any process can be considered as a continuum 
legacy problem, resulting from previous historical experience and the situations 
they previously experienced where “the more recent communist experience had 
a common impact on the political culture of the Balkan countries”11. In very 
broad lines, the Yugoslav (violent) disintegration was explained as products of 
the undemocratic nature of the old political system, and speciﬁ cally as parts of 
a clever strategy devised by former communist elites anxious to maintain their 
power.12 Th e Albanian anarchy of 1997 and the quasi-destabilization in 1998 
were also the result of the conﬂ ictual political culture demonstrated by the par-
ties which proved to be as ‘infected’ as of their communists predecessors since 
political opponents were considered ‘enemies’. Such arguments usually point out 
that these legacies placed several obstacles to comprehensive democratization and 
further developments. Th e question to be addressed here is why such legacies of 
the past brought (violent) dissolution and disorder only to some states such as ex-
Yugoslavia and Albania and not to other Eastern European countries (for example 
ex-Czechoslovakia)?
8. J. Bugajski, Facing the Future: Th e Balkans to the Year 2010, C 86 Discussion Paper, ZEI-Center for European 
Integration Studies, Bonn, 2001, p. 9.
9. V. Gligorov, M. Holzner, and M. Landesmann, Prospects for Further (South) Eastern EU Enlargement: Form 
Divergence to Convergence?, Global Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE), Vienna, 2003, 
p. 2.
10. International Commission on the Balkans, Unﬁ nished Peace, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1996.
11. O. Anastasakis & V. Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Regional Co-operation and European Integration, Th e Hellenic Ob-
servatory, Th e European Institute, Th e London School of Economics and Political Science, London, 2002, 
p. 6.
12. I. Krastev, “Th e Balkans: Democracy Without Choices”, Journal of Democracy, 13 (3), 2002, p. 43.
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Correlation between the homogeneity and acceptance of diﬀ erence as causes of state 
disintegration
In trying to answer the above question and ﬁ nd a bold explanation of why 
only some states may violently disintegrate we have to consider two aspects of 
the state: its homogeneity and the acceptance of diﬀ erence. We have to ask ﬁ rstly 
whether a state was (relatively) ethnically homogeneous or not? And if not, how 
much the diversity was accepted?
In a comparison between the Western Balkans and the Central Eastern Euro-
pean states, Rupnik argues that “the Central European states of the 1990s, unlike 
their Balkan counterparts, were much more homogeneous”.13 Ethnically diverse 
compositions characterized ex-Yugoslavia and became major disputes within and 
among the Yugoslavian successor states. And this was because “diﬀ erences be-
come a synonym for the ungovernability whereas homogeneity had become a 
prerequisite for future security and well-being”14 in the region. While in Central 
Europe “the absence of major minority or border issues at least partly accounts 
for the relative weakness of nationalist forces and for the lack of conﬂ ict among 
neighbouring states where Slovakia has been the exception”.15
Th e homogeneity argument alone is not suﬃ  cient to capture all cases (for 
example Albania is a homogenous country but it still went in anarchy in 1997) 
and it also fails to explain why other heterogeneous countries (e.g. then Czecho-
slovakia) did not involve into violent conﬂ icts after its dissolution. Th at is why 
the best explanation to such a situation may be found if we look at the correla-
tion between the homogeneity and acceptance of diﬀ erence as the cause of why 
states violently disintegrate. In all the Western Balkans cases disintegration came 
as a result of the exclusion from or dissatisfaction with the state of a part of its 
community (being an ethnic or civil group or even a state under the Federa-
tion). Th e coexistence of diﬀ erent political groups (the Albanian case) and ethnic 
groups (the ex-Yugoslav case) has been impossible and conﬂ ictual, with a high 
degree of mutual mistrust. On the other side, the state not only didn’t regulate 
these divergences among its citizens but in the contrary took one’s part. Such an 
‘improper state behaviour’ (usually referred to as ‘particularistic’ political culture) 
brought about the issue of legitimacy in citizens perceptions, creating so a huge 
gap between the state and (some of ) its own citizens. Th e Western Balkan states 
became illegitimate in the eyes of many of their citizens, because the latter were 
seeing them as dominated by a diﬀ erent (ethnic or political) group or, even more 
13. J. Rupnik, “Eastern Europe: the International Context”, Journal of Democracy, 11 (2), 2000, p. 118.
14. S. Bianchini, “Th e Collapse of Yugoslavia: Sources of its International Instability”, in Stefano Bianchini and 
Paul Shoup (eds.), Th e Yugoslav War, Europe and the Balkans. How to Achieve Security?, Longo, Ravenna, 1995, 
p. 28.
15. J. Rupnik, “Eastern Europe…, op. cit., p. 118.
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importantly, as serving vested particularistic interests.16 Th is lack of trust to state 
institutions and more the state intolerance and exclusion, in the Western Balkans 
case, resulted into the collapse of the state itself (the disintegration of Yugoslavia 
and disorder in the case of Albania).
In sum, as long as the Western Balkan states failed to create ‘citizenship’ ho-
mogeneity when ‘ethnic’ or ‘political’ heterogeneity was the case, and as long as 
a degree of acceptance of diﬀ erence was missing, the ‘Balkanization’ paradigm 
could be employed in the region. Positive state-citizens relationships should have 
been the alpha for building consolidated states in the Western Balkan countries.
3. Th e “Delay” Transition
CEEC-Western Balkans diﬀ erent transition
Transition, in the general meaning of the term, denotes “the interval between 
the dissolution of the old regime and the installation of a new regime”.17 In post-
communist literature, it is frequently being conceptualized as the transformation 
towards a pluralist democracy and a market economy. Such transformations re-
quired ﬁ rstly the creation of new institutions to guarantee the separation of the 
state from party control, and the introduction of a market economy, abandoning 
thus state economic planning. Furthermore, other fundamental reforms and new 
legal and administrative practices had to be introduced, in order to break up 
with the institutional legacies of communism. In the Western Balkans, after the 
disintegration was (almost) over and the authoritarian rule was getting weaker 
and weaker the transition process (building a liberal democracy and becoming 
oriented toward a market economy) came up again, this time as the main issue of 
the day. Although some degree of democracy and some economic reforms started 
since the beginning of the ’90s, it can be argued that the Western Balkans expe-
rienced transition later, at least in comparison to some of the CEEC countries. 
Rupnik in its ten-year assessment of the transition process gives “a picture of suc-
cesses in Central Europe oﬀ set by setbacks in the Balkans”.18
In evaluating the performance of a country in transition two main dimensions 
have to be considered. In the political ﬁ eld, the emphasis is on the formal aspects 
of democracy, in particular the introduction of free and fair elections while in 
the economic sphere, the emphasis is on liberalization, stabilization and priva-
16. D. Bechev & S. Andreev, Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up Aspects of the EU Institution-Building Strategies in the 
Western Balkans, Occasional Paper No. 3/05, South East European Studies Programme, European Studies Cen-
tre, University of Oxford, 2005, p. 6.
17. O’Donnell & Schmitter 1986, Reference from P. Kopecký & C. Mudde, “What has Eastern Europe… op. 
cit., 2000, p. 519.
18. J. Rupnik, “Eastern Europe…, op. cit., p. 115.
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tization.19 With regard to the status of these regions’ democracy one can notice 
clear diﬀ erences from the very beginning. In the Freedom House ratings, Central 
Eastern Europe has distinguished itself from the Western Balkans countries. If 
the Central Eastern European countries have been consider ‘free’, the countries 
of the Western Balkans have been considered at best only ‘partially free’. To give 
an example, in the years 1999-2000 the average democracy score was 4.83 for the 
Western Balkans, while 2.12 for the CEEC (smaller numbers indicating a higher 
level of democratic progress).20 As far as the economic transition is concerned, 
the gap is even more profound. “Th e economic performance of all transition 
economies in the Balkans has been worse than that in the CEE”21, since the two 
regions experience opposite development. If transition economies in the Central 
and Eastern Europe were successful, this was not the case for the Western Balkans 
which “in 1998 were much worse than they were in 1989, with their GDP in 
1998 representing 35% (Bosnia and Herzegovina) to 86% (Albania) of the 1989 
level”22. Such developments speak for a ‘delayed’ transition that Western Balkan 
countries experience in comparison at least to the CEE region.
New challenges and the governance incapacity to handle them
Th e transition process, beside recovery from conﬂ icts and disorder, brought 
new challenges for the region. In the political sphere, the main challenge was to 
establish a liberal democracy, since most of these countries were only ‘partially’ 
democracies23. A second important challenge was the creation of a positive iden-
tiﬁ cation with the state by the citizens. In the social ﬁ eld a weak organisational 
19. V. Gligorov, M. Kaldor and L. Tsoukalis, Balkan Reconstruction and European Integration, Th e Hellenic 
Observatory, Th e European Institute, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, Th e London School of 
Economics and Political Science and Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, 1999, p. 17. See 
also, K. Goetz, ‘Making Sense of Post-Communist Central Administration: Modernization, Europeanization or 
Latinization.’ Journal of European Public Policy 8 (6), 2001, p. 1032.
20. Freedom House, Nations in Transit 2006: Democratization from Central Europe to Eurasia, 2006.
Th e average for the Western Balkans are my own calculation since the survey include in the average also Ruma-
nia and Bulgaria. (Th e average including this two countries was 4.46 where Bulgaria scores 3.58 and Rumania 
score 3,54.)
NOTES: Th e ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress 
and 7 the lowest.
21. Gligorov et. al., Balkan Reconstruction… op. cit., 1999, p. ii.
22. M. Uvalic, Regional Cooperation in Southeastern Europe, Working Paper 17/01, ‘One Europe or Several?’ – 
Programme, 2001, p. 18.
23. For example referring to the Freedom House surveys 97, Serbia and Montenegro (then Yugoslavia) will be 
classiﬁ ed as being ‘not a free’ country till 1999 (with the exceptions during 90-91 and 92-92 as ‘partially free’). 
After 1999 the country was seen as ‘partially free’(till 2002) and from 2002 on it progressed to be ranked as 
‘free’. Bosnia and Herzegovina also was considered as ‘not free’ till 1996 and only after 1996 it was classiﬁ ed as 
‘partially free’. Croatia was considered as ‘partially free’ and only in 2000-2001, after the sequence of political 
change, was considered as ‘free’. Macedonia and Albania were classiﬁ ed as “partially free” and still will remain 
at this status. Albania, for example, failed many times in holding free elections and that reﬂ ected also on the 
relations with EU, as free elections proved to be a decisive element in starting and signing SAA negotiations 
with Albania.
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capacity of social actors and weak civil society was noticed. A key challenge to the 
Western Balkans economies already accomplishing a degree of stabilization was 
the creation of sound conditions for “self sustainable economic growth”24. Along 
these basic challenges in the political, economical and social sphere, other prob-
lems arise, where the most challenging were corruption and organized crime.
Th ese new challenges and the incapability to handle them showed once more 
the structural weakness of the Western Balkan states, which lacked suﬃ  cient gov-
ernance capacities to carry out the necessary reforms. Th ey proved to be inef-
fective states, incapable of fulﬁ lling the basic functions and of handling out the 
new problems arising. A lack of state institutions which could carry through the 
transition reforms and at the same time compile with the EU standards was no-
ticed. Th is process of building institutions capable of overcoming the new chal-
lenges has been one of the key issues of the post-conﬂ ict Western Balkans. But 
the capacity for institution-building was restricted due to limits imposed by the 
previous tensions as well as due to lack of political will. Yet “even when there was 
political will, authorities frequently lack the ﬁ nancial and administrative capabili-
ties to implement reforms and policies”25 for improving political and economic 
conditions. Regarding the economic aspects of the region, the consequence of 
transition strategies has been a degree of de-industrialization,26 where the margin-
al productivity of the new private sector proved to be insuﬃ  cient to oﬀ set the de-
cline of the state sector. Th e “socio-economic progress along market lines is only 
possible if there is an eﬀ ective state capable of fulﬁ lling its basic functions”.27
A more uncertain transition because of diﬀ erent modes of communism, the role of 
domestic political elites, and the EU
But what were the reasons that led the Western Balkans into a delayed transi-
tion and more importantly why did they stay behind in the process and hesitate 
to catch up in transition towards democracy? Th e literature takes a mix of ap-
proaches advancing a number of arguments. Some explanations count on the 
historical variables where an unsuccessful (delay) transition is as a result of the 
limited experience with liberal democracy before and during the onset of the 
communist rule.28 Th e range of possible ‘historical legacies’ causes go from the 
24. Gligorov et. al., Balkan Reconstruction… op. cit., 1999, p. 18. See also: M. Uvalic, “Economic Transition in 
Southeast Europe” in Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 3 (1), 2003, p. 63.
25. D. Bechev & S. Andreev, Top-Down vs. Bottom-Up… op. cit., 2005, p. 7.
26. Gligorov et. al., Balkan Reconstruction… op. cit., 1999, p. 17.
27. World Bank, Th e State in a Changing World, Th e World Development Report, Washington, 1997. Reference 
from Gligorov et. al. 1999, p. 19.
28. Such claims are opposed by latest research on democratic performance of Western Balkans countries from 
independence until WWII, were there is “no evidence to substantiate the blanket claim that democratisation 
failed in the Balkans”. A. Mungiu-Pippidi, W. van Meurs and V. Gligorov, “Plan B – B for Balkans: State Build-
ing and Democratic Institutions in Southeastern Europe” Berlin/Nijmegen/Vienna, 2007, p. 33.
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Ottoman past (with its particularistic culture) to recent (authoritarian) commu-
nist history. Other explanatory arguments take a more actor-centered institu-
tional approach pointing to the importance of domestic actors and institutional 
veto-points as well as the supportive role of EU. Transition itself is deﬁ ned as a 
“highly uncertain processes”29 and in the Western Balkans this uncertainty be-
come even higher than in CEEC for the reasons mentioned above.
Firstly, this is due to diﬀ erent trends of communism: In the CEE countries 
the communist regimes were to a large extent imposed by external intervention 
(Moscow) while only in Yugoslavia and Albania the communist revolution was 
carried out by indigenous elites.30 Such ‘imposed’ and ‘indigenous’ modes of com-
munism aﬀ ected diﬀ erently the uncertainty of the transition process. In Central 
and Eastern Europe the transition was more certain and welcomed since they 
were ‘ﬁ ghting’ for sovereignty, overthrowing not only the ‘imposed’ regime but 
mostly the inﬂ uence of Russia, an element that was missing in Yugoslavia and Al-
bania. Being already ‘independent’ from Russia, the issue in the Western Balkans 
was only the regime change; as a consequence transition was more uncertain.31
Adding to the “diﬀ erent modes of communism” argument, the role of po-
litical elites in reducing transition uncertainty needs to be acknowledged. In a 
number of CEE countries, for example, the transition to democracy was less 
uncertain, because either there was a powerful opposition having gained strength 
from popular mobilization against the regime (the Baltic, Slovenian, Czech, and 
Polish cases), and/or there were reform communists who had collaborated with 
an opposition committed to democracy (the Baltic countries, Slovenia, Poland, 
and Hungary).32 Th is was not the case for the Western Balkans.
Th e EU played an important role in reducing the uncertainty of transition, al-
beit not in an equal way, since it gave much greater political attention and ﬁ nan-
cial assistance to the CEEC. As a consequence, the CEEC progressed conﬁ dent 
towards institution building and reforms, while the European perspective of the 
Western Balkans remained far and uncertain.
29. P. Kopecký, C. Mudde, “What has Eastern Europe… op. cit., 2000, p. 519.
30. G. Almond, “Communism and Political Culture Th eory”, Comparative Politics, 15 (2), p. 134. See also: 
Mungiu-Pippidi et. al., (2007) “Plan B – B for Balkans… op. cit., 1983, p. 25.
31. Bunce give some detailed information on the support of the argument why transition to democracy in a 
number of CEE countries was in fact not so uncertain. First, the military was eliminated from the transition; 
and second, there was present a powerful opposition that gained strength from popular mobilization against 
the regime (as with the Baltic, Slovenian, Czech, and Polish cases) and/or reform communists who collaborated 
with an opposition committed to democracy (as with the Baltic countries, Slovenia, Poland, and Hungary). 
V. Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience”, World Politics, 
55 (2), 2003, p. 188.
32. V. Bunce, “Rethinking Recent Democratization… op. cit., 2003, p. 188.
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4. Th e “pre-Europeanization”
European orientation (integration) and pre-Europeanization
Despite the turbulence of the previous decade and the new transition chal-
lenges the Western Balkans are facing, their positive steps must be recognized. 
“Today, most of the problems and factors underpinning the Balkan wars seem 
to be over… what’s more the Western Balkans countries have achieved positive 
reform developments in the last couple of years”.33 Political changes in Croatia 
and later in Serbia changed the regional risks and turned the region towards EU 
integration.34 Economic development in the Western Balkans has been encourag-
ing and the prospects are positive.
Th e Western Balkans could thus leave behind the era of ‘Balkanization’ and 
catch up with transition. Highly important at this stage is that transition towards 
pluralist democracy and market economy is occurring in parallel to the evolving 
perspective of EU integration. In 2000, at the Feira European Council, the pros-
pect of EU membership has been extended to Western Balkans countries, where 
the Heads of EU States and Governments conﬁ rmed the prospect of the Balkan 
countries as potential candidates for EU membership.35 Th e target of member-
ship status has accelerated the progress and given new impetus, especially after 
the accession of the ten countries from Eastern Europe, the Western Balkans be-
ing now literally the next waiting in the queue (including Turkey).
In order to be admitted the aspiring countries had to strictly comply with the 
EU political, economical as well as legal requirements (known as the Copenhagen 
Criteria)36. Such a relation (EU conditionality – Western Balkans compliance) im-
plies that EU has an impact on the Western Balkans. Th is overall process, where 
European integration has an impact on to-become-member countries has been 
called ‘Eastern style’ Europeanization. For the Western Balkans, Europeanization 
33. S. Panebianco & R. Rossi, EU Attempts to Export Norms of Good Governance to the Mediterranean and 
Western Balkan Countries, Jean Monnet Working Papers in Comparative and International Politics (JMWP) 
n° 53, Jean Monnet Centre EuroMed – Department of Political Studies – University of Catania, Catania, 
October 2004, p. 15 & 20.
34. WIIW-Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Th e Western Balkans: Economic Development 
since Th essaloniki 2003, Vienna, March 2006, p. 1.
35. Th e EU “objective remains the fullest possible integration of the countries of the region into the political 
and economic mainstream of Europe…. All the countries concerned are potential candidates for EU member-
ship”. Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira, 19 June, paragraph 67.
36. Th e Copenhagen Criteria require that the candidate country must have achieved “stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the exist-
ence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces within the Union; the ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims 
of political, economic & monetary union.” See: Th e Copenhagen Criteria, DG Enlargement – Retrieved from 
< http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/criteria/index_ en.htm >.
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means adjustment to advanced western models as well as security and prosper-
ity for the future.37 In the actual phase of the Western Balkans we can speak of a 
pre-Europeanization process, since the current transformations are eﬀ ects of the 
preparation for accession. Europeanization in this context is ﬁ rst a member-state 
building process where Western Balkans states have to review much of their legis-
lation, adapt existing institutions or build new ones conforming to the EU’s leg-
islation, policies, and standards. As a result of this member-state building process, 
the Western Balkan states will experience major transformations (the most direct 
one is the revolutionizing of the structure of public administration; the social and 
economic convergence to EU standards; change in the substance and processes of 
democratic governance).38
Can the Western Balkans be Europeanized?
Many concerns and doubts have been raised on the Western Balkans readiness 
to join EU or furthermore if they would ever be ready for enlargement. Th e most 
sceptic observers have also questioned the region’s Europeanization capacity, con-
sidering the Western Balkan countries if not part of Europe at least periphery or 
second-class (potential) members (or third-class if the CEECs were second-class 
member of the Union). Th e issue gets more and more complex as the condition-
ality is growing.
But despite all this uncertainties and diﬃ  culties regarding future EU integra-
tion processes, what is probably most important here is that these processes are 
now irreversible even in a country like Serbia, where possible political changes are 
likely to inﬂ uence only the speed but not the general course.39 Recent research 
has shown that “ultimately, it is Europe (its norms and values) which stands as 
the common denominator around which a new collective identity of the Balkans 
has begun to crystallize”.40 Th is means that joining EU now stands as the only 
long-range vision for the Western Balkans. By now, the logic and momentum 
of European integration have made the inclusion of the Western Balkan states 
a foregone conclusion, a strategic inevitability.41 Besides this very optimistic pic-
ture, where “elites and constituencies throughout the region increasingly share a 
37.  O. Anastasakis, “Th e Europeanization of the Balkans”, Th e Brown Journal of World Aﬀ airs, XII (1), 2005, 
p. 80.
38. For a more detailed argument see: ESI – no date – Member State Building.
39. M. Uvalic, “Economic Transition… op. cit., 2003, p. 79, less emphasis.
40. D. Bechev, Constructing South East Europe: Th e Politics of Regional Identity in the Balkans, RAMSES Working 
Paper 1/06, European Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Oxford, March 2006, p. 22 (emphasis added).
41. Balkan Forum, Integrating the Balkans: Regional Ownership and European Responsibilities Discussion paper, 
Bertelsmann Foundation and Center for Applied Policy Research and Policy Planning Staﬀ , German Federal 
Ministry of Foreign Aﬀ airs, Berlin, July 2002, p. 6.
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European orientation”42, tangible measures need to be taken by the political elites 
since complying with EU standards and consequently the launch of the open-
ing process rests on them. Ultimately, the political will and commitment of the 
regional leaders determines the success or failure of the European package “con-
sisting of a bilateral (pre) association process, regional co-operation and proactive 
crisis management”43.
What it is argued here is that “the Western Balkans can be Europeanized”44, 
as Demetropoulou’s research concludes. Th is does not suggest that there is not 
much to be done. On the contrary, the problems with the Europeanization of 
the Western Balkans do not rest only on the formal compliance to the EU re-
quirements. Th eir greatest challenge will be to abandon practices of the past, so 
become ‘behaviourally Europeanized’.
Th e mechanism of inducing Pre-Europeanization changes
Th e European orientation rhetoric alone does not count much unless it is 
turned into actions, that is, political and economic reforms. Th e EU, from her 
side, has used both ‘reward’ or ‘punitive’ incentives in order to make the applicant 
countries comply with the set of membership conditions. Such mechanisms, of 
positive or negative conditionality, have been EU’s most powerful tool to in-
duce pre-Europeanization changes in the candidate countries. Until now, EU has 
exercised both a positive and a negative conditionality on the Western Balkan 
countries. Previous EU approaches had been marked by a number of negative 
conditionality. Th e exception is the signing with Macedonia of the SAA, as a 
reward for the end the conﬂ ict. Anastasakis and Bechev, in examining the condi-
tionality of the EU’s approach to the Western Balkans, call for the need to move 
“towards a positive conditionality”45. Such a positive conditionality would not 
only require the oﬀ er of a general membership perspective for the entire region, 
but also a more detailed road map of when each country would join. Th e Stabi-
lization and Association Agreements (SAA) are a step further and reﬂ ect a move 
forward in approaching the EU approach, “at the same time the punitive aspects 
of conditionality continue to play an important role and are an integral part of 
each SAA”46. It may be suggested at this point that such a ‘carrot-and-stick’ ap-
proach, through both reward and punitive mechanism, will still continue to be 
42. Balkan Forum, Rethinking the Balkans… op. cit., 2004, p. 5
43. Balkan Forum, Integrating the Balkans… op. cit., 2002, p. 7
44. L. Demetropoulou, “Europe and the Balkans: Membership Aspiration, EU Involvement and Europeaniza-
tion Capacity in South Eastern Europe”, Southeast European Politics, III (2-3), 2002, p. 88
45. O. Anastasakis & D. Bechev, “EU Conditionality in South-East Europe: Bringing Commitment to the 
Process”, European Balkan Observer 1 (2), 2003, p. 3–4
46. C. Pippan, “Th e Rocky Road to Europe: Th e EU’s Stabilisation and Association Process for the Western 
Balkans and the Principle of Conditionality”, European Foreign Aﬀ airs Review, 9 (2), 2004, p. 235
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the ‘inherent’ strategy for bringing the Western Balkans if not (in the near future) 
into the EU, at least next to closer to it.
A point to be argued is not much the conditionality per se, but which type and 
how to successfully use such incentives for Europeanizing the Western Balkan 
countries. Anastasakis and Bechev consider the application of conditionality in 
the region problematic.47 EU is ﬁ nding itself in a deadlock position, since on the 
one hand it is putting hard conditions to the Western Balkan countries, and on 
the other hand it cannot oﬀ er much to the region because the EU itself faces chal-
lenges of consolidation (especially with the latest failure of the Irish ‘No’ to the 
Lisbon treaty). But as scholars have been stressing out, the EU conditionality can 
be eﬀ ective only as long as the prospect of joining the EU is considered a realistic 
one.48 Th is is the best incentive for the region. Th e role of the EU in European-
izing the Western Balkans countries, and even more its membership “carrot” is 
crucial in accelerating the reforms, since “Europe (EU) has been as a magnet 
and source of inspiration for their eﬀ orts to built modern states and societies”.49 
‘Reinforcement by reward’ seems the best model to get the Western Balkans Eu-
ropeanized. On the contrary freezing or any postponement of EU enlargement 
“would discourage the Western Balkan countries which are using the prospect of 
membership as a motivation for painful reforms”.50
5. Conclusion
Scholars dealing with South-Eastern Europe have been heavily engaged in 
trying to explain the transitory period the region has been going through after 
the fall of iron curtain. Many paradigms and arguments have been put forward 
helping us understand the many transformations the region is experiencing. An 
attentive review and a careful consideration of the literature shows that the many 
arguments and explanations given are nothing but pieces of a complex puzzle 
that need to be considered all, in order to give the full and true picture of the 
region, its many transformations, challenges and causes. Processes in the Western 
Balkans have been not only prolonged but most of the times they have been run-
ning parallel to each other. Even though the Western Balkans political situation 
has not yet settled down in a new stable equilibrium and is still in a period of 
transformations, one thing seems certain: that the region is moving away from 
its old negative Balkanization paradigm towards a new more positive one, that of 
Europeanization.
47. O. Anastasakis & D. Bechev, “EU Conditionality… op. cit., 2003, p. 3.
48. J. Rupnik, “Eastern Europe… op. cit., 2000, p. 126.
49. D. Bechev, Constructing South East Europe… op. cit., 2006, p. 23.
50. H. Grabbe, Proﬁ ting from EU enlargement, Centre for European Reform (CER), London, June 2001, 
p. 60.
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Th is paper has tried to bridge the literature on Western Balkans reﬂ ecting the 
region’s dynamics and reality. It has proposed (for analytical purposes) to break up 
the complex Western Balkans transformation into three main processes, namely 
‘Last Balkanization’, ‘Delay Transition’ and ‘Pre-Europeanization’. Each of these 
processes makes a constituent part of the overall transformation happening in 
the Western Balkan and has been exposed with all its major speciﬁ c elements, 
challenges as well as causalities. Although for analytical purposes the models can 
be kept separate, in the real context of the Western Balkan transformation, it is 
diﬃ  cult to distinguish clearly when a process starts and the other ends since they 
overlap and may run together in parallel. Th at is why this paper has modest as-
pirations when it comes to speak of their interdependence and inﬂ uence on each 
other. Th e aim of these paper was mainly to highlight the signiﬁ cance of the exist-
ing as well as new ‘processes’, by showing their causes and speciﬁ c elements.
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